Reply
Thread Tools Display Modes
#1
Old 12-10-2011, 05:09 PM
Guest
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Challenger Deep
Posts: 10,423
Airbus A330 control system/ Air France flight 447

The transcript of the CVR from ill-fated Air France flight 447 has been published. It's reprinted here with running commentary. A minor sensor failure started the whole error chain, and then the cockpit crew spent a staggering four and a half minutes doing everything wrong: they handled a stall incorrectly, they ignored/disbelieved their instruments, and failed badly at the fundamentals of crew resource management.

There was, however, a conributing factor that I'm struggling to understand. The article indicates there are two joysticks for flight control, one on either side of the cockpit. Whereas a traditional control system provides two yokes that are mechanically linked and clearly indicate to both pilots what the position of the controls are, the fly-by-wire system on the Airbus A330 allegedly does nothing to communicate one pilot's inputs to the to other. The reported strategy for dealing with differing inputs from the two pilots is to calculate the average position of both joysticks and use that average as a single control input. In the case of Air France 447, one pilot was quietly pulling back on his joystick for most of the descent (holding the aircraft in a stall) while the other pilot remained baffled as to why the plane wasn't nosing over in response to the full-forward input he was providing on his own joystick. If the article is correct, then the system averaged both inputs into something close to a zero value for elevator control.

Can a professional pilot or aerospace engineer confirm whether the article has this right? That is, does the A330 really use the average of both joysticks to generate a single value for control input? If this is the case, given that it appeared to contribute to this horrible air disaster, what is the rationale for designing a flight control system this way?
#2
Old 12-10-2011, 05:50 PM
Member
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: In flight
Posts: 4,079
I am a non-professional pilot, but you are correct in general. However, the airplane does include a cockpit alert that illuminates when both sidesticks are providing input ("DUAL INPUT"), as well as button that allows either of the sidesticks to be deactivated. You can see the "Sidestick Priority" button in the upper-right of this photo:

http://airliners.net/photo/319771/L/

This seems a reasonable way to design a flight control system to me. It is desirable to provide a way for either pilot to make an emergency control input in the quickest time possible. If the captain becomes incapacitated on final approach, you do not want the copilot to have to flip some switch in order to take control. The fact that the copilot made the incorrect control input, and that the pilot failed to detect this, was simply human error.

The real flaw in the Airbus systems, which is probably mentioned in your transcript, is that the stall warning horn turned off at very low airspeeds. As a result, the pilots were able to get the airplane into a configuration where it was stalled, but the warning horn was not on, and when they provided the correct control input to recover from the stall, the warning horn turned on. I suspect that this was a major factor in their inability to make sense of the situation.

Last edited by Absolute; 12-10-2011 at 05:52 PM.
#3
Old 12-10-2011, 05:55 PM
Guest
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: London - England
Posts: 1,023
I also don't understand why the instrument panel does not show the orientation of the plane to the pilots. How could the airplane not tell the pilots that the nose was pointing up? Perhaps I've misunderstood the account.
#4
Old 12-10-2011, 06:16 PM
Guest
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Challenger Deep
Posts: 10,423
Quote:
Originally Posted by Fiendish Astronaut View Post
I also don't understand why the instrument panel does not show the orientation of the plane to the pilots. How could the airplane not tell the pilots that the nose was pointing up? Perhaps I've misunderstood the account.
This falls under the heading of "ignored/disbelieved their instruments." Yes, there is an attitude indicator (the artificial horizon), along with an audible stall warning, an angle-of-attack meter, an altimeter, and a vertical speed indicator. These clowns managed to successfully disregard all of that information, right up until they pancaked into the ocean. Bonin was pulling back on the stick despite the stall warning yelling at them repeatedly. Despite a VSI and an altimeter that were both indicating a rapid descent, at one point during the emergency they actually had a discussion about whether they were climbing or descending.

I suppose I ought not editorialize in GQ, but I'm angry and sad about how badly these guys failed in their responsibility as a cockpit crew.
#5
Old 12-10-2011, 06:32 PM
Guest
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Challenger Deep
Posts: 10,423
Quote:
Originally Posted by Absolute View Post
The real flaw in the Airbus systems, which is probably mentioned in your transcript, is that the stall warning horn turned off at very low airspeeds.
Is this (suppressed stall warnings at very low airspeed or high AoA) unique to Airbus aircraft?

FWIW the Wikipedia article indicates that the stall warnings are suppressed at very high angles of attack and/or airspeeds less than 60 knots. The account there indicates that during the emergency the airspeed did get that low, and the angle of attack got as high as 40 degrees.
#6
Old 12-10-2011, 07:09 PM
The Zeroeth Mod
Moderator
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Maryland
Posts: 11,074
I am new to flying, so I may be way off-base here, but would the stall horn turn off because it assumes that the plane, in such a configuration, is landing?
#7
Old 12-10-2011, 07:45 PM
Guest
Join Date: Jan 2009
Posts: 5,642
Quote:
Originally Posted by Asimovian View Post
I am new to flying, so I may be way off-base here, but would the stall horn turn off because it assumes that the plane, in such a configuration, is landing?
They land at around 250 km per hour so that can't be it.
#8
Old 12-10-2011, 08:17 PM
Member
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: In flight
Posts: 4,079
Quote:
Originally Posted by Asimovian View Post
I am new to flying, so I may be way off-base here, but would the stall horn turn off because it assumes that the plane, in such a configuration, is landing?
No. Unlike small Cessnas and the like, jets are not landed in a stall.
#9
Old 12-10-2011, 08:21 PM
Charter Member
Join Date: Aug 1999
Posts: 16,451
I think one huge part of the problem is when the plane is is normal law mode it is unstallable.
However with the lost of air speed data the computer switched to alternate law where the plane was able to stall.
Thee should be huge fucking warnings and horns and whatever that the plane is in alternate law.
I see nothing in this report that any such warning was given by the plane.
Piss poor design IMHO.
__________________
Remember this motto to live by: Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather one should aim to skid in sideways, chocolate in one hand, glass of Scotch in the other, your body thoroughly used up, totally worn out and screaming "WOO HOO! Man, what a ride!"
#10
Old 12-10-2011, 08:39 PM
Member
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: In flight
Posts: 4,079
The fundamental problem here was that one of the pilots provided the incorrect control input for almost the entire duration of the accident sequence, and (secondarily) none of the other pilots noticed.

Issues with the aircraft systems are tertiary factors - in the end, this person was poorly trained and panicked, and killed hundreds of people.
#11
Old 12-10-2011, 08:46 PM
Charter Member
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Santa Barbara
Posts: 2,186
Quote:
Originally Posted by Rick View Post
I think one huge part of the problem is when the plane is is normal law mode it is unstallable.
However with the lost of air speed data the computer switched to alternate law where the plane was able to stall.
Thee should be huge fucking warnings and horns and whatever that the plane is in alternate law.
I see nothing in this report that any such warning was given by the plane.
Piss poor design IMHO.
This PDF, A330 Flight deck and systems briefing for pilots, says there are several non-dismissable indications that the aircraft is in alternate law. I don't know how to link within a PDF, but it's about 20 pages in.

I read in one of the articles that the problem was not that the pilots did not know the plane was in alternate law, but that they probably did not fully comprehend what that meant, as it happens exceptionally rarely. Even so, the actions the pilots took, to my mind, were flat out wrong regardless of what mode the aircraft was in. They took an aircraft with fully functional engines and control surfaces and flew it into the ocean. Only thing wrong with that plane was a airspeed indicator giving funky results. They could have flown that airplane multiple times around the world without that information had they followed correct protocol.
#12
Old 12-10-2011, 08:51 PM
Charter Member
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Santa Barbara
Posts: 2,186
Quote:
Originally Posted by Absolute View Post
Issues with the aircraft systems are tertiary factors - in the end, this person was poorly trained and panicked, and killed hundreds of people.
I'm not even convinced he was poorly trained. He was certainly panicked.
#13
Old 12-10-2011, 08:54 PM
Member
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: In flight
Posts: 4,079
Quote:
Originally Posted by Machine Elf View Post
This falls under the heading of "ignored/disbelieved their instruments." Yes, there is an attitude indicator (the artificial horizon), along with an audible stall warning, an angle-of-attack meter, an altimeter, and a vertical speed indicator. These clowns managed to successfully disregard all of that information, right up until they pancaked into the ocean. Bonin was pulling back on the stick despite the stall warning yelling at them repeatedly. Despite a VSI and an altimeter that were both indicating a rapid descent, at one point during the emergency they actually had a discussion about whether they were climbing or descending.

I suppose I ought not editorialize in GQ, but I'm angry and sad about how badly these guys failed in their responsibility as a cockpit crew.
I don't think it is as bad as that. None of them knew, nor should have had any reason to think, that the copilot was providing a constant nose-up stick input.

It is pretty easy to see how the accident can happen, without anyone making mistakes other than the copilot. First, the airspeed indicators become invalid due to icing. Copilot, already nervous and jumpy, provides a nose-up input. Stall alarm sounds, but the airspeed indicators are invalid, so they may have dismissed the stall alarm as a system malfunction. Eventually, the airplane ends up in a configuration where it is flying so slowly that the airspeed indicators (now clear of ice) are invalid due to low speed, and the copilot is still providing a nose-up input. To the other pilot, this looks pretty much like a normal cruise/climb configuration, except he does not know what the airspeed is.

At this point, they are slightly nose-up, but with full throttle (and no airspeed indications). It is clear the plane is descending, but why? The nose-up attitude is quite shallow, and the airplane should be climbing (and it would be, if it were not flying so slowly). The other pilot, unaware of what the copilot is doing, wonders if they are in a stall (despite the lack of the horn), and provides a nose-down input. Now the airspeed indicator becomes valid, and the stall horn sounds! He backs off, and the stall horn turns off. So, from his perspective, they are not in a stall, but they are right on the edge of one, except it occurs with decreasing attitude! This makes absolutely no sense.

All the while, there is moderate to severe turbulence. At this point, he doesn't know what's happening, because the stall horn behavior is totally backwards from what he expects, so he's confused, and he's probably starting to panic, so his chance of figuring things out gets even smaller. "Why does the stall horn sound when I lower the nose?" "Why are we descending even though we're at only a 10-degree nose-up attitude with full throttle?"

They had a discussion about whether they were climbing or descending because the situation, from their perspective, was so bizarre. And remember that they were flying through a thunderstorm, and had just observed rare electrical activity (St. Elmo's fire), smelled a funny smell, and just witnessed the airspeed indicator stop working. It is perfectly reasonable for them to not trust their remaining instruments. As I said, if not for the copilot's stick input and the low airspeed (both of which were unknown to them), everything else about the control settings in the cockpit corresponded to a climb.

Last edited by Absolute; 12-10-2011 at 08:58 PM.
#14
Old 12-10-2011, 09:21 PM
Guest
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: San Francisco, CA
Posts: 2,204
Warning - very disturbing, but darkly fascinating (to me at least):

This is only tangentially related to the OP's question, but I have to mention this speculative account of the last minutes of AF 447, written by LSLGuy, an ex big jet pilot.
#15
Old 12-11-2011, 12:06 AM
Guest
Join Date: Mar 2002
Posts: 11,570
Quote:
Originally Posted by DarrenS View Post
I have to mention this speculative account of the last minutes of AF 447
That was written before the actual story was known, and was based on the notion of severe turbulence followed by structural failure. We now know this is incorrect, but possibly more plausible than the real cause: three nominally qualified pilots can't in 4+ minutes get control of a fully controllable aircraft.
#16
Old 12-11-2011, 02:54 AM
Member
Join Date: Nov 2001
Location: Madison, WI
Posts: 36,997
So, we have these possibilities, or a combination of them
1) The pilots had inadequate training for novel and emergency situations.
2. At least one of the pilots had some kind of major psychological breakdown due to the stress related to a novel emergency situation.
3. There is a problem with the flight control software. Not that it's defective per se, but that it behaves or fails to behave in a manner that pilots under stress imagine it should. Of course 5 different pilots under stress will probably imagine 5 different ways they would prefer the systems to work.

But I really can't ascribe this tragedy to anything other than training, but not of the "follow procedure # 1001" variety. I have to wonder if the fault is in the nature of simulator training itself, in that there are no real risks, and therefor no real stress. And that's what the pilots failed -- a stress test.

I'm not really sure what the state of the art is in psychological testing, so I'm not really sure whether there is a solution in a simulator environment. In a simulator, the pilots know that no matter how badly they fail, they will be stepping out and going home in a few more hours. The worst possible consequence they face is to lose their job after repeated failures to successfully complete the simulator challenges. This might be a little bit stressful, but surely that stress is dwarfed by being in a real plane plunging toward earth knowing you have to solve the problem quickly or die.

Can anyone comment about how big jet pilots are developed? I would presume one path is though the military, where the pilots get their initial and advance flight training, and ince they become civilians they really just need to learn some difference procedures and rules for commercial aviation, and get certified for the specific type of plane they will fly.

I'm sure there is some non-military track as well, and I have some questions about this. I assume the military has a pretty significant washout rate -- you are out and reassigned in relatively short order if you can't cut it. Is there anything in the civilian track that corresponds to this? I'm guessing that if you're wealthy enough to pay for your own training, you'll just pay for more time and training until you can pass whatever tests you have to. Is this correct?

Maybe I have an overly respectful view of military style training, but I wonder if commercial aviation pilot training needs to get more militarized. There seem to be an ever-increasing number (or perhaps percentage) of crashed caused by pilots who maybe shouldn't be at the controls at all.

I seem to be leading myself to the conclusion that training should in fact be riskier and more dangerous -- to the pilots of course, not planeloads of helpless passengers

Did any of the Air France pilots have military backgrounds?
#17
Old 12-11-2011, 04:34 AM
Guest
Join Date: May 2001
Location: 54N13E
Posts: 1,143
Quote:
Originally Posted by Absolute View Post
"Why does the stall horn sound when I lower the nose?" "Why are we descending even though we're at only a 10-degree nose-up attitude with full throttle?"
But that's the thing, really. If he had actually asked these questions out loud, everything could have been OK in short order.

I really don't understand why they didn't stop for a moment to think and talk early on. In the beginning, they weren't in any kind of situation that required a Sullenberger level of clearheadedness and quick wit. As the saying goes, nobody has ever collided with the sky. They were flying at 35,000 ft in an airplane with all the necessary bits and pieces still attached. Why not take a breath and catch up with your colleague who's sitting right next to you?
#18
Old 12-11-2011, 04:58 AM
Member
Join Date: Aug 2001
Location: On the outside looking in
Posts: 9,978
Quote:
Originally Posted by Boyo Jim View Post
I'm not really sure what the state of the art is in psychological testing, so I'm not really sure whether there is a solution in a simulator environment. In a simulator, the pilots know that no matter how badly they fail, they will be stepping out and going home in a few more hours. The worst possible consequence they face is to lose their job after repeated failures to successfully complete the simulator challenges. This might be a little bit stressful, but surely that stress is dwarfed by being in a real plane plunging toward earth knowing you have to solve the problem quickly or die.

Can anyone comment about how big jet pilots are developed? I would presume one path is though the military, where the pilots get their initial and advance flight training, and ince they become civilians they really just need to learn some difference procedures and rules for commercial aviation, and get certified for the specific type of plane they will fly.

I'm sure there is some non-military track as well, and I have some questions about this. I assume the military has a pretty significant washout rate -- you are out and reassigned in relatively short order if you can't cut it. Is there anything in the civilian track that corresponds to this? I'm guessing that if you're wealthy enough to pay for your own training, you'll just pay for more time and training until you can pass whatever tests you have to. Is this correct?

Maybe I have an overly respectful view of military style training, but I wonder if commercial aviation pilot training needs to get more militarized. There seem to be an ever-increasing number (or perhaps percentage) of crashed caused by pilots who maybe shouldn't be at the controls at all.

I seem to be leading myself to the conclusion that training should in fact be riskier and more dangerous -- to the pilots of course, not planeloads of helpless passengers

Did any of the Air France pilots have military backgrounds?
pilots with military backgrounds crash aeroplanes too. Sometimes in spectacular fashion.

Training should not be riskier to pilots, there are already enough fatal training crashes. If you train in the real aeroplane you have to introduce procedures to make the training lower risk. These procedures make the training sequences unrealistic and consequently of lesser value. You might be underestimating the stress involved in simulator training. Sure you know you're not going to die but if you fail, you're life as you know it may well be over. I've seen plenty of competent pilots fall over in the sim because the stress gets to them.
#19
Old 12-11-2011, 05:23 AM
Guest
Join Date: May 2009
Posts: 3,736
Quote:
Originally Posted by Machine Elf View Post
Is this (suppressed stall warnings at very low airspeed or high AoA) unique to Airbus aircraft?

FWIW the Wikipedia article indicates that the stall warnings are suppressed at very high angles of attack and/or airspeeds less than 60 knots. The account there indicates that during the emergency the airspeed did get that low, and the angle of attack got as high as 40 degrees.
I believe the reason the stall warnings were suppressed was because the forward airflow over the sensor was too low to register. It may be an ergonomic flaw, it might be better if the stall warnings were continued until the flight computer received a positive indication that the plane was no longer stalling. However, that could concievably lead to situations where the stall warning would continue sounding after the piot had taken corrective action.
#20
Old 12-11-2011, 10:06 AM
Guest
Join Date: Mar 2002
Posts: 11,570
Quote:
Originally Posted by Absolute View Post
First, the airspeed indicators become invalid due to icing. Copilot, already nervous and jumpy, provides a nose-up input. Stall alarm sounds...
It's worth noting that this sequence took some time. It's reasonable to ask why the second, more experienced copilot didn't question responding to a loss of airspeed indication with a steep climb. Had he said "Hey, let's at least try to hold our assigned altitude while we deal with this" they would not have ended up in a deep stall.


ETA: Further reading shows he did say "Pay attention to your speed" which may have meant vertical speed.

Last edited by Xema; 12-11-2011 at 10:09 AM.
#21
Old 12-11-2011, 11:55 AM
Guest
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Challenger Deep
Posts: 10,423
Quote:
Originally Posted by Absolute View Post
Stall alarm sounds, but the airspeed indicators are invalid, so they may have dismissed the stall alarm as a system malfunction.
It's certainly easier to stall an aircraft at low speed. However, a stall condition is based on angle of attack, not airspeed. If they dismissed it because of their thoughts about airspeed, then this was an additional mistake made by everyone in the cockpit.

Quote:
At this point, they are slightly nose-up, but with full throttle (and no airspeed indications). It is clear the plane is descending, but why?
They actually had a discussion about whether they were climbing or descending, despite what the instruments were telling them. This was another error made by everyone in the cockpit.

Quote:
The other pilot, unaware of what the copilot is doing...
...Because they weren't communicating...
If he's unaware of what his copilot is doing, then they aren't communicating like a cockpit crew should; that's a very important CRM failure for all of them. Presumably their training on the Airbus A330 includes developing an understanding of the control modes (and an awareness of the mode indicator as you describes upthread). Wondering why the plane isn't nosing over when I push my stick forward? Wait a minute, this is the A330, with two independent sticks, the guy next to me might be providing input. Robert should have asked Bonin what he was up to, or told him to take his hand off, or declared "I have the plane."

Quote:
Now the airspeed indicator becomes valid, and the stall horn sounds! He backs off, and the stall horn turns off. So, from his perspective, they are not in a stall, but they are right on the edge of one, except it occurs with decreasing attitude! This makes absolutely no sense.
...
"Why does the stall horn sound when I lower the nose?" "Why are we descending even though we're at only a 10-degree nose-up attitude with full throttle?"
A check of the AoA meter would have shown that their AoA was insanely high (as much as 40 degrees!), and that the plane was indeed pitching forward in response to Robert's forward stick input (when Bonin wasn't pulling back on his).

Quote:
It is perfectly reasonable for them to not trust their remaining instruments.
For a professional pilot, no, it's not reasonable. NTSB records are rife with incidents in which pilots (and their passengers) died because the chose to disregard/disbelieve their instruments and fly by the seat of their pants in IFR conditions.

Quote:
As I said, if not for the copilot's stick input and the low airspeed (both of which were unknown to them), everything else about the control settings in the cockpit corresponded to a climb.
Another failure on their part. The control settings do not determine the totality of their situation; as professionally trained pilots, they should have known that full power and a nose-high attitude can correspond to either a rapid ascent, or a stall condition.
#22
Old 12-11-2011, 05:38 PM
Guest
Join Date: Sep 2010
Posts: 640
Quote:
Originally Posted by DarrenS View Post
Warning - very disturbing, but darkly fascinating (to me at least):

This is only tangentially related to the OP's question, but I have to mention this speculative account of the last minutes of AF 447, written by LSLGuy, an ex big jet pilot.
Except that account is complete fiction. AF 447 suffered a conventional stall, stayed fully intact and hit the ocean on its belly, with its nose pointing upwards; ie. almost the exact opposite of that account.
#23
Old 12-11-2011, 05:53 PM
Guest
Join Date: May 2001
Location: 54N13E
Posts: 1,143
Quote:
Originally Posted by isaiahrobinson View Post
Except that account is complete fiction. AF 447 suffered a conventional stall, stayed fully intact and hit the ocean on its belly, with its nose pointing upwards; ie. almost the exact opposite of that account.
In LSLGuy's defense, he wrote that in June 2009, before any meaningful information on the fate of flight 447 was available.
#24
Old 12-11-2011, 06:04 PM
Member
Join Date: Aug 1999
Location: Alabama
Posts: 13,956
What I don't understand is, why don't they use motorized control levers that provide feedback on the setting? It seems to me, if the controls on the two seats aren't mechanically connected, they can (and should) be made to move together using servo motors or something.

Last edited by scr4; 12-11-2011 at 06:04 PM.
#25
Old 12-11-2011, 06:33 PM
Guest
Join Date: Apr 2008
Posts: 3,821
It doesn't make sense to me, but Airbus procedure was to pull the nose up and climb if airspeed indicators became unreliable. Was the copilot who kept pulling back just following his training?
#26
Old 12-11-2011, 07:14 PM
Member
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: In flight
Posts: 4,079
Pilots are not perfect, and they're not superhuman. Expecting them to reach perfectly accurate conclusions about the state of the aircraft in 4 minutes, under adverse conditions (a turbulent, electrical storm at night, out of contact with ATC, with one pilot intentionally and continuously doing the wrong thing) is expecting too much.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Machine Elf View Post
It's certainly easier to stall an aircraft at low speed. However, a stall condition is based on angle of attack, not airspeed. If they dismissed it because of their thoughts about airspeed, then this was an additional mistake made by everyone in the cockpit.
My point was just that, if I am flying along at 0.85 Mach and my airspeed indicator becomes unreliable, and subsequently I receive a stall warning, I might be inclined to dismiss the stall warning as a consequence of the invalid airspeed indicator.

Note that Air France did not provide training for airspeed indicator failure in high-altitude cruise.

Quote:
They actually had a discussion about whether they were climbing or descending, despite what the instruments were telling them. This was another error made by everyone in the cockpit.
A discussion about which instruments have failed and which can be trusted is not an error, it's a perfectly rational discussion to have when one instrument has failed already and the airplane is not doing what you expect it to. Ultimately, they did correctly determine they were descending.

Quote:
If he's unaware of what his copilot is doing, then they aren't communicating like a cockpit crew should; that's a very important CRM failure for all of them. Presumably their training on the Airbus A330 includes developing an understanding of the control modes (and an awareness of the mode indicator as you describes upthread). Wondering why the plane isn't nosing over when I push my stick forward? Wait a minute, this is the A330, with two independent sticks, the guy next to me might be providing input. Robert should have asked Bonin what he was up to, or told him to take his hand off, or declared "I have the plane."
I agree that poor CRM played a significant role. However, my understanding is the plane did nose over (since the two control inputs effectively cancelled), but that the stall alarm sounded, and Robert instinctively removed his nose-down input. I continue to think that this confusing stall alarm behavior played a major role in the accident. If the stall alarm had not sounded when Robert provided the correct input, he might have then observed the plane accelerate and determined that Bonin was screwing up. As it was, the airplane effectively punished him for doing the right thing, and I suspect this is what prevented him (and anyone else) from figuring out what was actually happening.

Quote:
A check of the AoA meter would have shown that their AoA was insanely high (as much as 40 degrees!), and that the plane was indeed pitching forward in response to Robert's forward stick input (when Bonin wasn't pulling back on his).
The A330 does not have an AoA indicator readily available to the pilots.

Quote:
For a professional pilot, no, it's not reasonable. NTSB records are rife with incidents in which pilots (and their passengers) died because the chose to disregard/disbelieve their instruments and fly by the seat of their pants in IFR conditions.
When an instrument has just failed, a cross-check of the remaining instruments is not just reasonable but required, especially when your control inputs are not doing what you expect and the airplane systems are doing other weird things.

Quote:
Another failure on their part. The control settings do not determine the totality of their situation; as professionally trained pilots, they should have known that full power and a nose-high attitude can correspond to either a rapid ascent, or a stall condition.
Yes, but:

1) The stall alarm was not on.
2) When Robert attempted to recover from a suspected stall, the alarm turned on.

I continue to think that it is unreasonable to expect the other pilots to have figured out what was happening in the 3 minutes it took for them to crash after the stall began, given Bonin's inexplicable incorrect inputs, the turbulence, and the counter-intuitive design of the air data system and stall alarm.

Yes, it is theoretically possible for them to have figured out what was happening. But people are not good at logical thinking under pressure. In fact, it's almost impossible. That's why pilots train heavily and rely on checklists - so that they know instinctively what to do in an emergency, and don't have to figure it out on the fly. Unfortunately, they were not trained for this event (high-altitude airspeed indicator failure), nor were they trained for handling it when their copilot other pilot handles it improperly.

Blaming the other pilots because they did not figure out, in 3 minutes under adverse conditions, that Bonin was screwing them all over and the stall warning system was not working as they expected, is not reasonable, IMO.

Last edited by Absolute; 12-11-2011 at 07:16 PM.
#27
Old 12-11-2011, 07:25 PM
Guest
Join Date: Jan 2009
Posts: 5,642
Can't the pilots see what input the other pilot is providing just by turning their head and looking at what they are doing on their stick? Eg shouldn't it have been obvious to Robert that Bonin was pulling back?
#28
Old 12-11-2011, 07:55 PM
Member
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: In flight
Posts: 4,079
Quote:
Originally Posted by coremelt View Post
Can't the pilots see what input the other pilot is providing just by turning their head and looking at what they are doing on their stick? Eg shouldn't it have been obvious to Robert that Bonin was pulling back?
Here is an A330 cockpit: http://cdn-airliners.net/aviatio.../9/1531901.jpg

Note that, in this photo, the pilots have their seats in the far aft position. When the seats are adjusted further forward so that the pilots can reach the rudder pedals, as would be the case in flight, each pilot's body mostly blocks the other pilot's view of his sidestick.
#29
Old 12-11-2011, 08:01 PM
Member
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: In flight
Posts: 4,079
Quote:
Originally Posted by scr4 View Post
What I don't understand is, why don't they use motorized control levers that provide feedback on the setting? It seems to me, if the controls on the two seats aren't mechanically connected, they can (and should) be made to move together using servo motors or something.
You don't want one pilot to have to overpower the servo motors if he wants to make an emergency correction to what the other pilot is doing.

Additionally, servos can malfunction just like anything else. You wouldn't want a short in the feedback/interlock system you are describing to result in the stick going full deflection in one direction and having the plane fly out of control until the pilots can manage to hit the "control stick feedback servo disable" button.

The system Airbus came up with is just fine. The two sticks inputs combine, which makes intuitive sense, and there is a warning displayed when both pilots are providing input, as well as a way for each pilot to disable the other's sidestick.

Robert could have regained control of the airplane - the problem was not that Bonin's inputs were preventing him from doing so. He likely would have succeeded in regaining control of the airplane, had the stall warning not gone off when he tried. In the configuration the airplane was in, going to neutral elevator (the result of a combined full up + full down input) would have reduced their attitude and allowed recovery from the stall, no matter what Bonin did (the stall was only maintained because of his full-up input). Robert was essentially prevented from doing so because of the counterintuitive stall warning system.

Last edited by Absolute; 12-11-2011 at 08:06 PM.
#30
Old 12-11-2011, 10:23 PM
Guest
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Medford, MA
Posts: 21,430
Quote:
Originally Posted by Absolute View Post
The system Airbus came up with is just fine. The two sticks inputs combine, which makes intuitive sense, and there is a warning displayed when both pilots are providing input, as well as a way for each pilot to disable the other's sidestick.
I read a book a few years ago about how to design machine interfaces. The author was critical of the Airbus sidestick compared to traditional, mechanically-linked yokes. The yoke is the biggest control, reflecting its importance. There's no question about what inputs the plane is receiving. You don't need to look over at the other pilot to see what he's doing, you can feel it. In this accident, both pilots were trying to control the plane. I remember hearing of other cases where each pilot thought the other was doing the flying.

Maybe some of that was FUD spread by Boeing, and Airbuses have a good safety record. Yes, there are mechanisms for one pilot to override the other, but during an emergency I think the important things should be as intuitive as possible. People shouldn't have to adapt themselves to the needs of a machine; the machine should be designed to work with people's natural habits and perceptions.
#31
Old 12-12-2011, 12:37 AM
Member
Join Date: Mar 1999
Location: N/W Arkansas
Posts: 8,144
It is a committee airplane.
Any way to find out which committee designed the flight control system and how much high time pilot input there was and how much of that they ignored.

No cites but hanger flying from some airline pilots tell of other things that airbus did with are so counter to universal pilot training and all other large airplane operating parameters that it SHOULD be criminal IMO.

Lets just go with the side stick connection for now.
Lets use only opinions from 20,000 hr plus airline pilots on how good & well planned it is and what they think of using it in an emergency ......

These thigs are big & really complicated and even Sully missed several things because the manual is just too big, to counter intuitive and there was not time.

They do not put young low time pilots in these things, or they should not. Lots of lives there. But they want a pilot who all his flying career he was taught that this was what to do and this is what is safe to do and then throw them in a plane that what was safe is now unsafe.

Then the emergency and they sometimes use their oldest and strongest and safest training for all those hours & years and the fact that on page 330 in fine print at the bottom in one place only they say, "Oh you do that & the airplane will break unlike every other airliner in the world."

If one pilot can provide an input that the other will not notice in an emergency situation that will kill them all, then there is bad design.

Crew management mistakes is just another link that will compound the problems ......

Last edited by GusNSpot; 12-12-2011 at 12:38 AM. Reason: fumble fingers.
#32
Old 12-12-2011, 11:24 AM
Guest
Join Date: Jul 2005
Location: N of Denver & S of Sanity
Posts: 12,256
Quote:
Originally Posted by Machine Elf View Post
This falls under the heading of "ignored/disbelieved their instruments." Yes, there is an attitude indicator (the artificial horizon), along with an audible stall warning, an angle-of-attack meter, an altimeter, and a vertical speed indicator. These clowns managed to successfully disregard all of that information, right up until they pancaked into the ocean.
Slight Hijack
I've listened to a few CVR after crashes and I'm amazed how many times the pilots ignore the "bwoop bwoop Pull Up!"
#33
Old 12-12-2011, 01:23 PM
Guest
Join Date: Feb 2005
Location: UK
Posts: 3,276
Forgive a non-aviator for asking what may be a silly question, but having read this thread, the transcript linked in the OP, and some other commentary, what I cannot understand is why no-one saw the altimeter spinning its way to zero throughout the whole sequence? Surely that would have been a strong indication that they were in a serious stall? Or did that in fact happen, and the problem was that no-one noticed Bonin had the stick back? Amazing that 3 qualified pilots could get things so wrong.
#34
Old 12-12-2011, 02:28 PM
Charter Member
Join Date: Aug 1999
Posts: 16,451
This seems appropriate http://worth1000.com/entries/29854/farside
__________________
Remember this motto to live by: Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather one should aim to skid in sideways, chocolate in one hand, glass of Scotch in the other, your body thoroughly used up, totally worn out and screaming "WOO HOO! Man, what a ride!"
#35
Old 12-12-2011, 10:29 PM
Member
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: In flight
Posts: 4,079
Quote:
Originally Posted by Dead Cat View Post
Forgive a non-aviator for asking what may be a silly question, but having read this thread, the transcript linked in the OP, and some other commentary, what I cannot understand is why no-one saw the altimeter spinning its way to zero throughout the whole sequence? Surely that would have been a strong indication that they were in a serious stall? Or did that in fact happen, and the problem was that no-one noticed Bonin had the stick back? Amazing that 3 qualified pilots could get things so wrong.
They did see it, and they did correctly attempt to recover from a stall even though the stall warning horn was not going off. However, when they tried to do so, the stall warning horn turned on, and so they stopped, at which point the horn turned back off.

IMHO, this probably confused them enough to prevent them from recognizing the actual problem in time. Instead, they probably thought that something was seriously wrong with the airplane, and did not want to risk making it even worse by "entering" a stall.

I have not seen anything that suggests that they received any training about the operation of the airspeed indicators and stall warning system at very low airspeeds / in deep stalls. If they had had more time, they might have been able to figure out that they were in fact flying so slow that the stall warning system was inoperative - but they only had between 2 and 3 minutes.

The more I think about this, the more I conclude that the most egregious error here was the design of the stall warning system. When the pilots did the right thing, provided the correct control input and actually improved their situation (by lowering the nose and increasing their airspeed), the airplane systems told them they had made it worse (because the airspeed was now high enough for the stall warning system to function, and it told them they had just entered a stall). As a result, they stopped doing the right thing - and died.

It is true that the whole incident could have been avoided if Bonin had been properly trained and/or hadn't panicked, or if the crew had practiced better CRM, etc. But in the end, the airplane's avionics lied to them about what was happening. It told them they were not in a stall when they actually were, and when they actually decreased the severity of the stall and began to recover, it told them they had made things worse.

Last edited by Absolute; 12-12-2011 at 10:31 PM.
#36
Old 12-12-2011, 10:32 PM
Charter Member
Join Date: Dec 2000
Location: Connecticut, USA
Posts: 5,113
Quote:
Originally Posted by Robot Arm View Post
I read a book a few years ago about how to design machine interfaces. The author was critical of the Airbus sidestick compared to traditional, mechanically-linked yokes. The yoke is the biggest control, reflecting its importance. There's no question about what inputs the plane is receiving. You don't need to look over at the other pilot to see what he's doing, you can feel it. In this accident, both pilots were trying to control the plane. I remember hearing of other cases where each pilot thought the other was doing the flying.

Maybe some of that was FUD spread by Boeing, and Airbuses have a good safety record. Yes, there are mechanisms for one pilot to override the other, but during an emergency I think the important things should be as intuitive as possible. People shouldn't have to adapt themselves to the needs of a machine; the machine should be designed to work with people's natural habits and perceptions.
Quote:
Originally Posted by GusNSpot View Post
...If one pilot can provide an input that the other will not notice in an emergency situation that will kill them all, then there is bad design.
Exactly. I'm just a non-pilot layman, but the Airbus A330 cockpit design seems idiotic to me. The control stick, which should be the most important input device in the cockpit, has been relegated off to the side. If there had been two control yokes mechanically linked together, it would have been obvious to Robert that Bonin was pulling back, because his own yoke would also be pulled back.

Also, this idea of the plane's fly-by-wire system averaging conflicting pilot inputs seems stupid. Suppose the same type of system was in a car, and the intent was to avoid a pothole in the road. If one pilot swerved left, and the other swerved right (either of which would result in going around the pothole), the averaging of inputs would cause the vehicle to drive right into it.

Finally, the placement of the sidesticks (to the left of the pilot, and to the right of the copilot) seems tailor-made to discourage the development of "muscle memory" if a pilot/copilot were to switch seats, not to mention being forced to use one's non-dominant hand to fly the plane in such a design.
#37
Old 12-12-2011, 10:45 PM
Guest
Join Date: Mar 2002
Posts: 11,570
Quote:
Originally Posted by Absolute View Post
They did see it, and they did correctly attempt to recover from a stall even though the stall warning horn was not going off. However, when they tried to do so, the stall warning horn turned on, and so they stopped, at which point the horn turned back off.
But wouldn't any pilot of an aircraft the size of an A330 understand the sort of time necessary for the plane to gain some useful speed, once the nose is lowered?

I fully agree that "Stall warning comes on as airspeed increases" is a highly dubious scheme, and very plausibly contributed to the problem here. But it seems you also need some notable lack of understanding by the pilots for that to have blocked a proper stall recovery. A significant point is that proper airspeed indications were restored almost 4 minutes before they hit the water.
#38
Old 12-12-2011, 11:08 PM
Charter Jays Fan
Moderator
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Oakville, Canada
Posts: 38,502
Quote:
Originally Posted by GusNSpot View Post
It is a committee airplane.
Any way to find out which committee designed the flight control system and how much high time pilot input there was and how much of that they ignored.

No cites but hanger flying from some airline pilots tell of other things that airbus did with are so counter to universal pilot training and all other large airplane operating parameters that it SHOULD be criminal IMO.
Airbus planes aren't exactly careening out of the sky on a regular basis; they seem to have a pretty good safety record.
#39
Old 12-12-2011, 11:12 PM
Member
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: In flight
Posts: 4,079
Quote:
Originally Posted by Xema View Post
But wouldn't any pilot of an aircraft the size of an A330 understand the sort of time necessary for the plane to gain some useful speed, once the nose is lowered?

I fully agree that "Stall warning comes on as airspeed increases" is a highly dubious scheme, and very plausibly contributed to the problem here. But it seems you also need some notable lack of understanding by the pilots for that to have blocked a proper stall recovery. A significant point is that proper airspeed indications were restored almost 4 minutes before they hit the water.
But then the airspeed indications became invalid again, not because of icing this time, but because the plane was flying too slowly for the sensors to register. They were not sure of how fast (or slow) they were flying.

They certainly suspected they were in a stall, but did not know how the stall warning system operated. So, when they tried to recover from a stall by lowering the nose, and only then the stall warning horn turned on, they thought "Shit, I guess we're not in a stall after all, what the fuck is going on?"
#40
Old 12-13-2011, 12:30 AM
Guest
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Medford, MA
Posts: 21,430
Quote:
Originally Posted by robby View Post
Exactly. I'm just a non-pilot layman, but the Airbus A330 cockpit design seems idiotic to me. The control stick, which should be the most important input device in the cockpit, has been relegated off to the side. If there had been two control yokes mechanically linked together, it would have been obvious to Robert that Bonin was pulling back, because his own yoke would also be pulled back.
The book that I mentioned used a very trivial example to make a point; doors. If you design a door correctly, you should never need to put the words "push" or "pull" on it. Make a big, flat panel and people will instinctively push on it. If there's a big, curved bar, everybody knows that they should pull on it. A properly designed machine takes advantage of those natural perceptions.

Quote:
Originally Posted by RickJay View Post
Airbus planes aren't exactly careening out of the sky on a regular basis; they seem to have a pretty good safety record.
They have a very good safety record, and no one will rest until it's perfect.

Aircraft safety is an amazing field. The lengths that we go to to investigate accidents is extraordinary. Planes today are as good as they are because thousands of people have busted their asses to find out why previous planes crashed. These recorders were found almost two years after the crash, under 12,000 feet of water. Airbus planes are very, very safe. It's now their job to learn from this accident and make their next one better.
#41
Old 12-13-2011, 12:38 AM
Member
Join Date: Mar 1999
Location: N/W Arkansas
Posts: 8,144
Quote:
Originally Posted by RickJay View Post
Airbus planes aren't exactly careening out of the sky on a regular basis; they seem to have a pretty good safety record.
Not a military plane.
Not a home built.
An airliner with hundreds of passengers all the time.

Pretty good does not get it.

Not heard of many people demanding an Airbus.

Many people I know practice, "If it ain't Boeing, I ain't going."

Here is my biggest fault with Airbus.

I learned to drive a stick shift.
Drove only a stick shift for many years.
I'm 68 now & I still stamp the clutch pedal position in a true PANIC stop situation. That does no harm.

What if in some new car, stamping the floor in a panic situation caused it to kill the occupants? A good design?

All pilot training I ever heard of, you are taught that at or below max maneuver speed you can not hurt the airplane with control inputs.

In the some of the airbus aircraft you can not do that with the rudder, the airplane will break.

So the pilots practice that before flying the line.

In a true panic situation, what will a pilot likely do? He will do his oldest & strongest habit that he was taught was perfectly safe things to do. 30 years of training & repetition or a less than 200 hrs in an simulator?

It is always the pilots fault & I agree with that..... But making a design like that is wrong & shows a willingness to kill hundreds of people to so disregard a normal human reaction.

IMO, thank good pilots, not the airplane.

Not all pilots are equal, including me. When the stuff hits the fan, better a good airplane, than a not so good one as a good pilot can not always overcome a built in defect. Average pilots are even more in a hole.

I'm sure these problems are being addressed in the simulator training as a stop gap measure but until pilots start from scratch with those kinds of reactions built in, then not fixing the airplane is criminal IMO..

And who can we force to do that, which country, which company? It is a committee after all. And we know how well that usually works. ( <-- personal bias that I hold when it comes to airplanes I was expected to fly. )

Your Flight Time May Vary
#42
Old 12-13-2011, 01:47 AM
Member
Join Date: Aug 2001
Location: On the outside looking in
Posts: 9,978
Quote:
Originally Posted by GusNSpot View Post
Many people I know practice, "If it ain't Boeing, I ain't going."
That is religion speak. Aeroplane religion. Boeing pilots think Boeing is best, Airbus pilots think Airbus is best. You live in America where Boeings are made, you're most likely surrounded by Boeing pilots.

Quote:
Here is my biggest fault with Airbus.

I learned to drive a stick shift.
Drove only a stick shift for many years.
I'm 68 now & I still stamp the clutch pedal position in a true PANIC stop situation. That does no harm.

What if in some new car, stamping the floor in a panic situation caused it to kill the occupants? A good design?

All pilot training I ever heard of, you are taught that at or below max maneuver speed you can not hurt the airplane with control inputs.
That training is wrong. At and below the manoeuvre speed you will stall due excessive angle of attack before you exceed the G limits. This protection is in the pitch axis only, you can still break the aeroplane with full and abrupt rudder inputs, particularly if you reverse the inputs.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Robby
Finally, the placement of the sidesticks (to the left of the pilot, and to the right of the copilot) seems tailor-made to discourage the development of "muscle memory" if a pilot/copilot were to switch seats, not to mention being forced to use one's non-dominant hand to fly the plane in such a design.
That's the same in nearly all aircraft and it's not an issue. A couple of days in the aeroplane and your muscles are reprogrammed. All right handed captains in Boeing aircraft fly with their non-dominant hand.

Last edited by Richard Pearse; 12-13-2011 at 01:51 AM.
#43
Old 12-13-2011, 09:41 AM
Guest
Join Date: Mar 2002
Posts: 11,570
Quote:
Originally Posted by Absolute View Post
But then the airspeed indications became invalid again, not because of icing this time, but because the plane was flying too slowly for the sensors to register. They were not sure of how fast (or slow) they were flying.
I agree that this is a likely explanation of what was going on. But I wonder why they were not cross-checking with other instruments (e.g. attitude indicator), which could have quickly cleared up the confusion. The evidence suggests that the airspeed indication is the only one that appears to have failed - all other instruments behaved properly throughout.

Quote:
They certainly suspected they were in a stall, but did not know how the stall warning system operated.
Yet, by your theory (which I agree is quite plausible) their actions were largely controlled by this one system - which they didn't understand.
#44
Old 12-13-2011, 10:58 AM
Guest
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Virginia Beach, Virginia
Posts: 854
Quote:
Originally Posted by Richard Pearse View Post
That is religion speak. Aeroplane religion. Boeing pilots think Boeing is best, Airbus pilots think Airbus is best. You live in America where Boeings are made, you're most likely surrounded by Boeing pilots.
More than a decade ago, I saw a TV show where an executive from Luftansa said much the same thing. He felt the fly-by-wire use by Airbus had a major flaw in that the pilots could not feel feedback through their controls, and therefore had to gather all of their information about what the plane was doing through their eyes. "Too much information through one channel", I believe he said.
He also said that Luftansa would not buy Airbus planes as long as he was with the company, because he did not think they were safe.

Just saying that anti-airbus sentiment isn't limited to the US.

The show was a series called Survival In the Sky, and it was all about crash investigation. I think it ran on Discovery or The Learning Channel, back when they both showed shows that were actually informative.
#45
Old 12-13-2011, 10:58 AM
Guest
Join Date: Feb 2005
Location: UK
Posts: 3,276
Just wanted to say thanks for the further replies (particularly from Absolute) which have helped me to understand this a bit more. Presumably (I must admit I haven't checked) the full accident investigation report is still some way off - when it is published, that will inform us all further. I guess that's when the lawsuits agains Airbus/Air France will begin...

Last edited by Dead Cat; 12-13-2011 at 10:59 AM.
#46
Old 12-13-2011, 01:01 PM
Member
Join Date: Mar 1999
Location: N/W Arkansas
Posts: 8,144
Quote:
That training is wrong. At and below the manoeuvre speed you will stall due excessive angle of attack before you exceed the G limits. This protection is in the pitch axis only, you can still break the aeroplane with full and abrupt rudder inputs, particularly if you reverse the inputs.
Richard, you fly the big iron, I don't. Which aircraft will break below max maneuver speed with aileron & / or rudder inputs?
#47
Old 12-13-2011, 01:13 PM
Guest
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: Location: Location:
Posts: 10,482
At the end of the day, Bonin pulled back relentlessly on the control.

He just kept pulling back. I mean, it doesn't matter what was going on, what alarm or safety was built in, what alarm was going off, what each pilot thought, who was napping, what was served for dinner... it doesn't matter what training took place or what color the planes.... the dude just kept pulling back to climb. THE WHOLE TIME.

I mean... barring an AI device that recognizes an officer/pilot is going to kill everyone and deactivates their control the only safety mechanism that could have helped was an ejection seat at that point.

All this discussion, and time and time again, the answer was spoon fed to him. But he kept pulling back to climb.

He just pulled back the whole time. That is not flying or being in charge of anything. That's like the folks who press the accelerator down on a car and hold it there until they smash into a building or run people over. Forget all the reasonable input for reasonable people. Forget the gauges and car working properly. Forget ABS brakes and warning signs.

When they add in more safety features, it will be to help reasonable people make decisions and fly the plane. At the end of the day, what will be put in place to address unreasonable people?

.

Last edited by Philster; 12-13-2011 at 01:14 PM.
#48
Old 12-13-2011, 01:32 PM
Charter Member
Join Date: Jul 1999
Location: SEC
Posts: 13,723
But what I've been trying to figure out was: Was Bonin pulling back, and--if so--for how long?
#49
Old 12-13-2011, 02:15 PM
Guest
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: Location: Location:
Posts: 10,482
It's all funny, Earl, until someone dies.
#50
Old 12-13-2011, 02:34 PM
Member
Join Date: Aug 2001
Location: On the outside looking in
Posts: 9,978
Quote:
Originally Posted by GusNSpot View Post
Richard, you fly the big iron, I don't. Which aircraft will break below max maneuver speed with aileron & / or rudder inputs?
Not that they're exactly "big iron" but in my training on both the Dash 8 that I used to fly and the BAe146 that I currently fly, we were warned not to make full abrupt rudder inputs at any speed. I know it was an Airbus A300 that had the rudder failure but it really just highlighted a misunderstanding about Va in the piloting community. Va gives no protection against over controlling the rudder, all it means is that if you pull back abruptly on the yoke/stick the wings will stall at or before reaching the max certified g loading so you can't break the wings.

To be honest I'm not a big fan of the Airbus design philosophy although I've never flown one except for an hour in a simulator a while back. I think there is too much hand holding by the aeroplane and I suspect it leads to a gradual loss of real flying skills, but there are plenty of pilots around who've flown both Boeings and Airbusses and think highly of the Airbus. It's mainly a matter of what you're used to and personal preference.
Reply

Thread Tools
Display Modes

Posting Rules
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts

BB code is On
Smilies are On
[IMG] code is Off
HTML code is Off

Forum Jump


All times are GMT -5. The time now is 11:21 PM.

Copyright © 2017
Best Topics: steptic stick tor-con wakerupper prank exploding rocks simpsons newsletter dali drugs rf modulator hd russian paratroopers ww2 robert vaughn commercial rolex overhaul price vicious wolverines upskirt commando most dense liquid vitriol oil cds stands for b sharp note dramamine for sleep cf moto v3 causeway meaning flareside pickup masturbating while breastfeeding all white colleges oozemaster 3.5 victorinox scissors unsalted anchovies abstaining vote portuguese america pussycat origin pepsi am wife in stocking cooked cum shaping obsidian smells like a skunk in my apartment underwear for big dicks honors program cu boulder can a dog eat ham is jerry springer show fake gay dates who pays wurlitzer spinet piano weight an enigma wrapped in a paradox and shrouded in a conundrum car shakes after starting d&d 3.5 pantheon how to heal your tongue after eating sour candy soft pack vs hard pack old man saggy balls how do you euthanize a fish what chinese food should i order whose line is it anyway fake fable 2 the archaeologist quest how much nyquil is too much okcupid messages not working walgreens drug test kit accuracy chloe sevigny sucks dick how to get out of the army early with an honorable discharge average pet sitting rates per day is baked beans a vegetable pickling cucumbers vs regular cucumbers post office keys for mailbox burnt orange car color how to remove a stuck cleanout plug birthplace of clinton quarter poster mounted on foam board what happened to jenny in forrest gump songs for baby videos lion vs bear who wins